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An Overview of the Influx of Grey Market Goods
Into the United States
Richard B. Kelly*
Parallel imports raise the controversy of whether owners of
goods which are internationally traded should enjoy unencumbered
trade or whether the importation of those goods should be restricted
by trademark laws. The act of importation, not the goods them-
selves, is the center of debate. Parallel imports are genuine, mass-
merchandised consumer products bearing a brand name protected
by a trademark or copyright. The goods are sold by the manufac-
turer or a subsequent purchaser in the distribution chain to an im-
porter for overseas resale. Often the U.S. marketing subsidiary or
other authorized agent of the foreign manufacturer challenges the
subsequent parallel importation and sale of these goods in North
America by "unauthorized" agents. The authorized agent usually al-
leges that parallel importation amounts to unfair competition in vio-
lation of U.S. trademark, copyright, contract, or criminal laws.
Proponents of free trade in these goods insist that competition
with parallel independent U.S. importers imposes price discipline on
authorized distributors. Restricting unauthorized imports results in
substantial price increases for U.S. consumers. To avoid legitimizing
geographical price discrimination, intellectual property law should
include the antitrust concept of universality for the purpose of defin-
ing the geographic scope of the rights of authorized distributors.
Universality results in worldwide competition and provides lower
prices to consumers. Conversely, geographical price discrimination
leads to "monopoly profits" for foreign manufacturers and their
marketing affiliates. Foreign manufacturers who control the chan-
nels of distribution can potentially avoid U.S. income taxes by charg-
ing arbitrarily high wholesale prices to traditionally wholly-owned
U.S. marketing subsidiaries, thereby shifting the excess gain earned
in this country to an earlier portion of the transaction.' This infla-
tion of wholesale prices enables foreign manufacturers to avoid the
* Partner, Kelly, Eckhaus & Mohen, New York, New York. B.B.A. 1960, Iona Col-
lege; J.D. 1967, New York University.
I For judicial recognition of foreign manufacturers' ability to set prices different
from those paid by independent U.S. importers, see Hamrick v. United States, 585 F.2d
1015 (Ct. Cl. 1978); F & D Trading Corp. v. United States, 580 F.2d 414 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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transfer pricing rules of Internal Revenue Code section 482,2 giving
foreign manufacturers an added incentive to avoid the price disci-
pline imposed by alternative suppliers.
Opponents of parallel imports argue that "grey market goods"
are "unauthorized" and misrepresent the products' qualities, serv-
icing, and warranties. They stress that allowing parallel imports
reduces the investment foreign manufacturers make in trademark or
copyrighted products, making prohibition necessary to protect in-
vestments of U.S. dealers in advertising and services. These argu-
ments are based on U.S. intellectual property law and various
criminal statutes.
The "grey" market is at the crossroads of several fundamental
bodies of law. Recent suits brought against the U.S. government and
importers, based on an array of theories, 3 are viewed by some as
"strike suits" commenced or threatened against discount retailers
and middlemen. Individual defendants with meager resources, or
limited revenues derived from a particular product, have economic
disincentive to challenge these suits. The spectral of criminal
charges further chills their defense despite intervention in some of
these lawsuits by individual members of the Coalition for Competi-
tive Imports. In such a litigious, unstable environment, trial judges
often are not in a position to review adequately overall policy consid-
erations, and rational national policy cannot be made.
Little impartial economic data exists on the consequences of
eliminating resale competition. The existing evidence suggests that
free competition is the preferable option for domestic consumers
and the independent U.S. businessman. Furthermore, other coun-
tries do not reciprocate by protecting U.S. manufacturers in foreign
markets.
The antitrust bar refuses to allow purported characterization or
label classifications to override market realities. This practice is use-
ful in the examination of claims for special protection under intellec-
tual property rights. The companion U.S. Supreme Court cases of
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 4 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co.5
suggest an initial perspective. In those cases, the Court determined
that simulation "knockoffs" of lamp designs were unfair competi-
tion.' The Court stressed that if a product was not sufficiently
unique to merit a monopoly granted under federal intellectual prop-
erty laws, it can be sold with impunity.7 These cases recognize the
limited need to restrict competition and to encourage "creativity."
I.R.C. § 482 (1978).
. See infra notes 51, 57, 75, 83, 117, 133 and accompanying text.
4 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).6 See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232; Conipco, 376 U.S. at 236.
7 See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232; Conipco, 376 U.S. at 236.
[VOL. I I
INFLUX OF GREY GOODS
By analogy, parallel imports, identical goods made in the same plant
by the same manufacturer, should be allowed if the creator of the
product has made its first sale and realized its profit incentive.
I. Trademarks
A. Section 526
Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 19308 provides that in the
absence of the mark owner's written consent, it is unlawful to import
foreign manufactured merchandise bearing a registered trademark
owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or
organized within, the United States. A copy of the certificate of re-
gistration must be filed with the Secretary of the Treasury in the
manner provided by section 42 of the Lanham Act.9 Merchandise
imported in violation of section 526 is subject to seizure and forefei-
ture.10 Though the statute does not provide specific exceptions, the
Customs Service has consistently recognized that goods manufac-
tured abroad under the authority of the U.S. trademark owner
should not be barred from importation.II
The legislative history of section 526(a) is well documented. 12
After enactment of the Trademark Act of 1905,13 Fred Gretsch Manu-
factuhing Co. v. Schoening t4 and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 15 tested the
meaning of the phrase "copy or simulate" in the Act. In Gretsch a
German manufacturer of violin strings gave an exclusive agency for
the sale in the United States to a company which registered the
trademark. 16 In Katzel a French manufacturer of "Java" face powder
sold its entire operation and trademark to Bourjois, which imported
and repackaged it under the "Java" trademark. 17 Katzel bought the
powder directly from the French manufacturer and sold it in the
original French packaging.18 The trademark purchasers in both
cases brought suit claiming that sale of the imports violated their
8 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
10 Section 42 of the Lanham Act provides that no imported merchandise that copies
or simulates a trademark shall be admitted into the United States. The Customs Service
Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986), implement both § 526 of the Tariff Act and § 42
of the Lanham Act. Almost without exception (see infra note 24 and accompanying text),
however, § 42 has been held to apply only to merchandise bearing counterfeit or spurious
trademarks that copy or simulate genuine ones. See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States,
627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
11 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1986).
12 See generally Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
13 Ch. 592, §§ 1-30, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1982)).
14 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
15 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
16 Gretsch, 238 F. at 780-81.
17 Katzel, 275 F. at 539-40.
18 Id.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
trademark rights. In both cases, the Second Circuit held that the
trademark on the challenged imports did not copy or simulate the
plaintiffs' marks, reasoning that the Act was not intended to bar
trademarked imports if the mark accurately described the manufac-
turing source for the goods. 19
Section 526(a) was enacted in response to Katzel.20 The section
was added as a floor amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922.21 The
legislative history is sparse, consisting of a short floor debate and a
brief paragraph in the Conference Report. That paragraph makes
clear that the purpose of section 526(a) was to reverse Katzel.
A recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals holds that existing
law does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the
same trademark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported
merchandise is genuine and if there is no fraud upon the public.
The Senate amendment makes such importation unlawful without
the consent of the owner of the American trademark, in order to
protect the American manufacturer or producer .... 22
As Judge Hand noted, it "was intended only to supply the casus
omissus supposed to exist in section 27 of the Act of 1905 (Comp.
St. § 9513), because of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bourjois v. Katzel .... Had the Supreme Court reversed that deci-
sion last spring, it would not have been enacted at all." 2 3
Shortly after section 526(a) became law, the Supreme Court re-
versed Katzel, holding that the Trademark Act of 1905 outlawed im-
portation of trademarked goods from a foreign manufacturer when
the foreign manufacturer had sold the U.S. trademark to the plain-
tiff.2 4 Section 526(a) nevertheless remained. In 1936, the Customs
Regulations of 1931,25 promulgated pursuant to the Act, responded
to many concerns raised in the initial debate.26 Goods of foreign
manufacture bearing a genuine trademark were prohibited imports
absent the U.S. trademark owner's consent, but this protection was
not extended if the same entity owned the foreign and domestic
trademarks.2 7 Thus, the plaintiff in Katzel who bought the U.S. trade-
19 Id. at 543; Gretsch, 238 F. at 782.
20 See H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd, 293 F.
344 (2d Cir. 1923).
24 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 689.
25 T.D. 48, No. 537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936).
26 The Customs Regulations of 1931 were amended to add the following:
However, merchandise manufactured or sold in aforeign country under a trade-mark
is registered and recorded, or which trade name is recorded under the trade-
mark laws of the United States, shall not be deemed for the purpose of these
regulations to copy or simulate such United States trade-mark or trade name if such
foreign trade-mark or trade name and such United States trade-mark or trade name are
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mark rights to a product would have been protected. Imports of
genuine goods bearing the trademark of the foreign company that
sold its U.S. rights were outlawed. 28 The 1936 regulation also bars a
company from registering a trademark in both the United States and
abroad, selling the trademarked goods abroad and restricting impor-
tation of these goods into the United States. 29
The thrust of this regulation remains unchanged. In 1972, the
Bureau of Customs revised the 1936 regulation to provide that re-
strictions relating to trademark imports do not apply to imported ar-
ticles when:
(1) both the foreign and U.S. trademarks are owned by the same
person or business entity;
(2) the foreign and domestic trademark owners are parent and subsidiary
companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control; or
(3) the articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark applied
under authorization of the U.S. owner.3 0
Under the new regulation, Customs will not restrict genuine imports
bearing a trademark if the foreign and domestic trademark owners
are the same, closely related, or the U.S. trademark owner consented
to the application of its trademark to the imported goods.
Opponents of grey market goods contend that Customs' inter-
pretation of section 526(a) is unreasonable because it permits grey
market importers to exploit a trademark holder's goodwill. The ar-
gument amounts to a theory of geographic territoriality of trademark
rights not previously recognized by the courts. It asserts that the
continued introduction of diverted goods will destroy the essence of
the trademark and the property value it represents by permitting
third parties not contributing to the products' goodwill to obtain a
free ride. Plaintiffs seek to block middlemen from buying the di-
verted merchandise cheaply in Europe, the Far East, or elsewhere,
and then importing the goods into this country, underselling the
"authorized" dealers by as much as forty percent.
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo3 1 raises doubt about the validity of
Customs' current policy under section 526(a), but the Osawa court
specifically declined to decide whether Customs had, exceeded its au-
thority.32 Osawa was not appealed and thus, lacks precedential value.
In Bell & Howell. Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co.33 the Second
Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction on the grounds that legiti-
mate goods of the foreign manufacturer did not confuse consumers
as to their source. 34 The court specifically held with respect to cam-
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1986) (emphasis added).
31 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
32 Id. at 1177.
33 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
34 See id. at 45-46.
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eras that
there would appear to be little confusion, if any, as to the origin of
the goods and no significant likelihood of damage to BHMC's repu-
tation since thus far it has not been shown that Masel's [the competi-
tive importer's] goods, which have a common origin of manufacture
with BHMC's goods, are inferior to those sold by BHMC and are
injuring BHMC's reputation.3 5
The court found an analogous situation in Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United States Customs Service,36 suggesting that the plaintiff does not
lose anything to which it was entitled:
[T]he Plaintiff's international enterprise was paid and receives compensation
for the Oscar de la Renta products which are manufactured and pro-
duced by one of the Plaintiff's entities and.., receives the royalties
due it. Therefore, there is no evasion of legal rights flowing either
to the manufacturer in the first instance or the person or entity enti-
tled to the royalties. What is occurring is that a complete circle has
brought some of the Plaintiff's products back to haunt it in the
United States.
37
The Court recognized in Parfums SternM 3 8 that competitive imports
benefit consumers. No court of appeals has held that section 526
bars the importation of genuine trademarked goods. District courts
have upheld the validity of the 1972 regulations. 39
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States40 the International Court of Trade
upheld the validity of the Customs Regulations in an exhaustive and
compelling analysis of the legislative history of the Act and regula-
tions. That opinion, however, did little to clarify the existing state of
the law.
4 1
In Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International (America) Corp.4 2
the Ninth Circuit also considered the propriety of parallel imports
and recognized that some genuine goods created a likelihood of
public confusion about the trademark. The court, however, found
35 Id. at 46.
36 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
37 Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 421. The court stated:
[T]here is adequate evidence that the public has the benefit of lower prices in
that those products . . . are usually less expensive than sold by Plaintiff
through its authorized distributors .... Therefore, it appears that the Court
would be doing the public a disservice by preventing the dissemination of
what appears ... to be equally good, yet less expensive, legitimate Oscar de
la Renta fragrance products.
Id.
39 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911; United States v. 89 Bottles of "Eau de Joy," 797
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
40 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
41 Vlivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552. The court did not examine or fully consider the thor-
ough analysis of the lower court.
42 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983).
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no confusion was created since Daewoo's shirts were not imitations
of Monte Carlo products.4 3 Indeed, Daewoo shirts had been pro-
duced for Monte Carlo by Daewoo under a contract for future sale
which was subsequently cancelled. 44 Similarly, in El Greco Leather
Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.4 5 the district court held that genuine
shoes manufactured for plaintiff in Brazil under authority of plaintiff
trademark owner (for orders which were then cancelled) was not in-
fringing under either section 32 or section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 46 Also, in DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co. ,47 the court held that it
was "anomolous" that a trademark infringement action would lie
where the soap sold by the defendant parallel importer was in fact
genuine and not "spurious." 4
8
B. Section 1337
Section 1337 of the Tariff Act of 193049 provides for proceed-
ings before the International Trade Commission (ITC) and prohibits
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, im-
porter, consignee or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which
is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and eco-
nomically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establish-
ment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States. 50
Section 1337, sometimes perceived as an "anti-dumping" statute, re-
cently was invoked to prevent parallel imports in Duracell, Inc. v.
United States International Trade Commission.
5 1
In Duracell 5 2 a U.S. battery manufacturer attempted to prevent
parallel imports purchased from a related company overseas. The
case was uncommon because the overseas company was the subsidi-
ary, and the U.S. company actually made the product in the United
States.53 The U.S. trademark holder filed a complaint with the Inter-
national Trade Commission, and three of the five commissioners
voted to exclude the imports. 54 President Reagan disapproved the
decision on January 4, 1985, on both substantive and procedural
43 Id. at 1058.
44 Id.
45 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
46 Id. at 1384.
47 622 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1980).
48 Id. at 622 n.1.
49 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
50 Id. § 1337(a).
51 Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 823 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984),
disapproved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g), 50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in
225 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 824.
54 Id.
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grounds.5 5
Despite the finality of Duracell, a toy manufacturer recently filed
another grey market goods case under section 1337 in In re Matter of
Certain "Cabbage Patch Kids" Dolls naming various sellers as respon-
dents.56 The complainant brought ten separate federal lawsuits in
six different states. 57 Though the ITC complaint admits that the par-
allel imports are manufactured by a duly authorized licensee, it nev-
ertheless cites section 1337 of the Tariff Act. This is, however, in
conjunction with section 602(a) of the Copyright Act. 58
C. Foreign Jurisdiction Judicial Decisions
The Supreme Court of Canada faced the issue of parallel im-
ports in Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd. 59 The
court held that Seiko could not prevent parallel imports of "grey
market" watches, finding that neither the classic doctrine of "passing
off" nor other claims of unfair competition were applicable to the
sale of a package. 60  The court reasoned that an extension of the
doctrine to include these circumstances would result in monopoly
situations, not unlike patent monopolies, because only authorized
dealers would be able to offer the "complete package." Further-
more, the court indicated that a different decision might unwisely
55 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862 (Jan. 4, 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The disapproval stated:
The Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1124), one of several grounds for the Commission's determination, is at
odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation by the Department of
Treasury .... Recent decisions of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia and the Court of International Trade explicitly uphold the Treas-
ury Department's interpretation. Allowing the Commission's determination
in this case to stand could be viewed as an alteration of that interpretation. I,
therefore, have decided to disapprove the Commission's determination. The
Departments of Treasury and Commerce, on behalf of the Cabinet Council
on Commerce and Trade, have solicited data from the public concerning the
issue of parallel market importation and are reviewing responses with a view
towards formulating a cohesive policy in this area, Failure to disapprove the
Commission's determination could be viewed as a change in the current pol-
icy prior to the completion of this process.
Id.
56 See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 640 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
57 See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 640 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
58 See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 640-F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Il. 1986).
59 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583.
60 Id.
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recognize that marketers could control the sale of legitimately ac-
quired property. 6 1
II. Copyrights
U.S. copyright claims rest upon a different statutory standard
than trademarks. Section 602(a) of the Copyright Act 62 provides:
Infringing importation of copies or phono records: Importation into
the United States, without the authority of the owner of the copyright under
this title, of copies . . . of a work that has been acquired outside of the
United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies...
under Section 106, actionable under Section 501.63
A plain reading of the statute reveals that consent of the over-
seas owner of the copyright is sufficient "authority" to distribute.64
A copyright owner lacks an exclusive right to prohibit importation,
however, because "exclusive right to distribute" is defined in section
106 of the Copyright Act only to include the rights
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending .... 5
These sections should be read to permit any activity not described by
section 106, such as parallel importation. This interpretation is con-
sistent with various federal laws governing the subject.6 6
Section 109 embodies the "first sale" doctrine, under which the
owner loses control over a specific product once it is sold. Thus,
though the subsequent owner cannot reproduce the product or dis-
tribute unauthorized copies, the new owner may dispose of it and use
it in any manner not limited by section 106.67
61 Id. at 606. In Consumers Distributing the defendant lawfully acquired Seiko watches
and sold them in Canada where the plaintiff was the only authorized distributor. Guaran-
tees accompanied the Seiko watches sold by the defendant. The plaintiff, however, did not
recognize those guarantees. Since the "product" included the guarantee and the Seiko
watches, the plaintiff argued that defendant had attempted to pass off the watches and
guarantees as products sold by plaintiff. The court rejected this argument because the
defendants gave public notice that the guarantees were not made by plaintiff. According
to the court, this notice alleviated any market confusion caused by plaintiff's sales. There-
fore, the doctrine of passing off was held inapplicable. Id. at 602, 604.
62 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982).
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id.
65 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (emphasis added).
66 For example, § 109 of the Act states:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy of phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
(b) The privileges prescribed by subsection (a) do not (unless authorized by the
copyright owner) extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or
phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan or otherwise,
without acquiring ownership of it.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) (emphasis added).
67 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) and 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
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The International Trade Act of 1930,68 however, appears to
limit parallel importation.69 This import prohibition, however, is fo-
cused on the narrow problem of possible fraud attendant in a bona
fide sale of exclusive U.S. trademark rights to an independent U.S.
company. The situation addressed by Congress in Katzel involved a
foreign company which reneged on a transaction in which a domestic
company had purchased exclusive U.S. rights; Congress in no way
intended to limit parallel imports with this Act. As was held in
Vivitar:
Congress adopted § 1526(a) to protect an American trademark
owner, like the one in Katzel, who had purchased the trademark of an
independent foreign company. Congress decided it was unfair to
permit unauthorized imports of goods bearing the foreign com-
pany's trademark. These imports violated the rights of the American
trademark owner purchased from the foreign company in an arms-length trans-
action . . . . [T]he sole purpose of § 1526(a) was to resolve this
problem.
70
Section 1526(a) is inapplicable when the U.S. copyright owner
has authorized production and first sale of the work abroad, earning
a profit on the price set when the copyright owner introduced the
goods into international commerce. Extending section 602 beyond
Katzel allows international price discrimination, which disrupts the
harmony between trademark, copyright, and antitrust law, discour-
ages creative product development, and frustrates a fundamental
purpose of the law. Congressional testimony on the precursor of
section 602(a) reveals that Congress was aware of the issue. 71 As
with trademarks, Congress intended that importation after first sale
be no more an infringement of a copyright owner's rights than any
other distribution after first sale of the copy. 7 2
There was no direct counterpart to section 602(a) in the copy-
right law prior to 1976. The House Report accompanying the Act
explains that section 602 was designed to address two separate cate-
68 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
69 Section 1526(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawftl to import
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise,
or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper or receptacle bears a trademark
owned by a citizen of or by a corporation or association created or organized within the
United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person
domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title
15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed
with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in section 106 of
said Title 15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the
time of making entry.
Id. § 1526(a) (emphasis added).
70 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 434.
71 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMMENT ON PRELIMINARY DRAFI FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 190, 209 (Comm. Print 1974).
72 For a further explanation of congressional activity, see infra note 144 and accompa-
nying text.
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gories of importations: (a) importations of so-called unauthorized
"piratical copies" and (b) unauthorized importations of copies that
have been lawfully made. 73 The House Report defines the second
category as lawfully made copies whose "distribution would infringe
the U.S. copyright owner's exclusive rights."'74 This passage sug-
gests that importation would be prohibited only when, under sec-
tions 106(3) and 109(a), the accompanying distribution would be
infringing. The report does not state specifically that section 109
limits 602, though it seems that section 602 is limited by both sec-
tions 106 and 109.
In Cosmair, Inc. v. Jade Drug Co.75 fragrances were sold in the
United States, then exported and later re-imported into the United
States. While there had been a first sale in the United States clearly
cognizable under section 602, the goods later were acquired outside
the United States. 76 The court found no reason to construe congres-
sional intent to require that section 602 prohibits such imports. 77
There is thus insufficient authority to support the claim that Con-
gress intended to confer upon copyright owners a unique power to
deny U.S. consumers access to genuine, authorized foreign
merchandise.
The Lanham Act, the International Trade Act, section 1337, the
Sherman Act, and other federal statutes should be construed in pari
materia.78 Reading the trademark laws, copyright laws; and antitrust
laws consistently, rather than in conflict, is important when analyzing
a statute that has not received wide judicial interpretation. Section
602(a), which governs the "subject matter of Section 526, should be
presumed in accord with the policy embodied in" that prior stat-
ute.79 Congress cannot be presumed to have undone the choice it
made with respect to section 526.
Whether a company that expressly "authorizes" the sale of its
goods abroad and releases them into world commerce can withdraw
its consent at the U.S. border has been examined under copyright
law. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio 8 0 plaintiff alleged
that an importer of records purchased from an overseas manufac-
73 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169, 170 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.
74 See id. at 170, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5683-84.
75 Cosmair, Inc. v. Jade Drug Co., No. H-85-116, slip op. (S.D. Tex. 1985); see also
Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enter., 226 U.S.P.Q 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).76 jade Drug, No. H-85-116, slip op.
77 Id. The court analyzed the relationship between §§ 109 and 602 of the Copyright
Act and recognized the first sale doctrine as controlling. Id.
78 See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 344, 351 (1940);J.G.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (4th ed. 1972) ("[Absent] express repeal
or amendment .... new provision[s] [are presumed] ... in accord with the legislative
policy embodied in... prior statutes .... [Thus,] they all should be construed together.").
7,) Dynamite Enter., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
80 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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turer, who was authorized to sell exclusively in the Phillipines, vio-
lated section 602. The trial court, with little analysis of the
competing interests and conflicting precedent, agreed, adopting a
territoriality concept of distribution. 81 The court concluded that in-
terpreting sections 106 and 109 otherwise would meaninglessly deny
plaintiff control over the domestic market. Scorpio conflicts with
other parallel import cases recognizing the "first sale" doctrine.8 2
The court did not consider that Congress may not have meant to
equate control over importation with the right to control distribu-
tion. The court failed to apply antitrust considerations of the free
flow of international commerce balanced with the need for restric-
tion to encourage creativity.
Scorpio cited Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Elcon Industries, Inc.83 in
which the trial court granted a temporary restraining order and an
injunction against the importer of an electronic game similar to
"Donkey Kong."'84 Although the U.S. distributor was a wholly
owned subsidiary of the foreign manufacturer, a foreign licensee of a
similar game sold its product to a U.S. importer, raising an issue of
confusion by "misrepresentation. ' 85 Because Nintendo rests on the
more traditional type of infringement of competing products, rather
than the same product, it is inappropriate authority for the grey mar-
ket goods issue.
Copyright laws advance the public welfare by promoting creativ-
ity,8 6 while giving the public maximum access to the work. 8 7 The
financial reward guaranteed to the copyright holder is an incident of
this general objective, rather than an end in itself.8 8 Once the au-
thor's profit is exacted from the first sale of the work, the purpose of
the law is satisfied. Free trade in copies sold in the marketplace
thereafter should be encouraged. The Supreme Court has noted
that the limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: crea-
tivity is encouraged, but ultimately serves availability. 89 The interest
of the United States and the object of conferring a monopoly lies in
the general benefits derived by the public. 90
In such circumstances continued control over the distribution of copies is not so
81 See id. at 49. See also Weil Ceramics & Glass v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.NJ. 1985)
(barring importation of genuine goods).
82 See, e.g., Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416
(S.D. Fla. 1983); Dynamite Enter., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
83 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
84 /d. at 938.
85 Id.
86 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
87 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 1974),
aff'd, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
88 See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
81) See .1lazer, 347 U.S. at 201; see also Twentieth Century 11usic, 422 U.S. at 151.
9() See Twen tieth Centreu
,
.Miusic, 422 U.S. at 156.
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much a supplement to the intangible copyright, but is rather primar-
ily a device for controlling the disposition of the tangible personal property
which embodies the copyrighted work. Therefore, at this point the
policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to the policy oppos-
ing restraints of trade and restraint on alienation.91
The exclusive right of distribution supplements control of unau-
thorized copying. The copyright owner's protection against distribu-
tion of authorized copies is inapplicable where the copyright owner
consents to the first sale. Granting a foreign manufacturer further
rights unduly restricts the public's access to copyrighted work be-
cause the enterprise takes its profit from a "first sale" in exchange
for creativity. The legitimate goal of the copyright statutes is
achieved whether authorized copies are made in the United States or
overseas. Hence, U.S. antitrust laws prohibiting restraints of trade
apply with equal force to foreign and domestic goods. 92 A restrictive
interpretation of section 602 otherwise would enable copyright own-
ers to carve up international markets, making the United States an
island of high prices in a worldwide sea of competitive prices.
III. Conceptual Limits of Intellectual Property Rights
The "globalization" of the international economy blurs distinc-
tions between import-competing companies, export-competing com-
panies, and domestic companies. It is almost universally recognized
that international competition is desirable and is best fostered in an
arena of free trade. 93 Grey market goods usually are imports of a
foreign manufacturer with a U.S. marketing subsidiary. Domestic
employment, industrial protection, and balance of trade arguments
are irrelevant to the "grey market goods" issue because U.S. manu-
facturing and jobs are not ordinarily involved in parallel imports.
Section 602s protections should apply wherever the merchan-
dise is manufactured. If national policy only recognized first sales
made in the United States, a copyright owner would avoid the "first
sale" doctrine and prevent importation by manufacturing the prod-
ucts overseas. It is not in the national interest to promote overseas
manufacture of domestically sold goods.
A trademark, copyright, or patent licensee is suspect when it
seeks to extend its rights beyond the promotion of the creativity
needed for the initial sale of the product. 94 Our economic system
1)1 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (1985) (citing Blazon, Inc. v. De Luxe
Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
1 2 See Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
1' See Calvani Recognizes Importance of Global Competition in Analyzing Antlitrust Issues, 49
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 888, 890 (1985) (international competition is desira-
ble and should occur in an arena of free and fair trade and the International Trade Com-
mission should not be a forum for harassment of competitors); Acting FTC Chairman Teny
Calvani and President Reagan hold fast against protectionism, TIMF, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22.
94 There is little hard economic data suggesting that enforcing the antitrust laws in
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favors unfettering the dynamic forces of commerce and technologi-
cal change. Opponents of parallel imports fail to show that re-
straining trade is desirable or the least restrictive means to achieve
innovation.
Tying restrictions are one of many examples of unjustified limi-
tations.9 5 Tie in sales serve no purpose beyond suppression of com-
petition.96 Tying sales that attempt to extend market power from
the copyright monopoly into other commerce are per se illegal.9 7
Because "[c]opyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to
fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust
laws,"' 98 the misuse of patents, trademarks, and copyrights can con-
stitute an antitrust violation. 99
IV. Antitrust Violations
Worldwide division of markets is often illegal.' 00 These
schemes are either horizontal, between competitors on the same
level of distribution, or vertical, extending down or up the levels of
distribution. Horizontal territorial limitations are restraints of trade
with no purpose except to prevent competition, and are per se un-
lawful.101 Vertical restraints are prohibited in most circumstances.
A domestic manufacturer or distributor is not permitted to es-
tablish exclusive selling territories for authorized retail dealers un-
the intellectual property context deters innovation. See Ordover, Economic Foundations and
Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property, 55 ANTITRUST LJ. 504 (1985).
See generally F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH, SCHUMPTERAN PERSPECTIVES (1984)
(study of the impact of technological innovation on economic growth and welfare);
Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 AM.
EcON. REV. 1097 (1965) (empirical study of the relationship between inventive activity and
technological opportunity, firm size, product-line diversification, and monopoly power);
Spence, Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance, 52 ECONOMETRICA 101 (1984)
(analysis describing and evaluating the performance of markets with varying structures);
Utterback, Innovation in Industry and the Diffusion of Technology, 183 SCIENCE 620 (1974)
(study of the process of innovation by firms).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (tying arrangements foreclose competition in markets other than those in
the patented product or process).
96 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
97 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977); United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
98 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. i, 19 (1979). See
also Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 608-09 (1953).
9 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176
(1965).
100 See Timken, 341 U.S. at 593; see also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127, 145 (1966); Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 980 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 915 (1982); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp.
1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973).
101 See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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less a reasonable benefit to consumers justifies the restraint.' 0 2 Nor
may a U.S. manufacturer of trademarked goods, seeking to establish
a higher price in one part of the country than in another, institute
trademark infringement actions to prevent sales by a dealer from the
low-price market into a high-price market.'0 3 An express division of
markets among related corporate users of an internationally known
trademark is scrutinized.' 0 4 That a market division was adopted to
implement an international trademark licensing system is of no con-
sequence, for a "trademark cannot be legally used as a device for a
Sherman Act violation."' 0 5 The illegality is not removed by coupling
it with intellectual property right restrictions. Similarly, a monopoly
conferred on the use of a trademark or copyright may not be used to
eliminate competition. 10 6 In United States v. American Linen Supply
Co. 107 a patent holder prohibited its licensees from soliciting any cus-
tomer who was being served by another licensee. Acknowledging
that licenses could impose "reasonable restrictions" within the scope
of the patent monopoly, the court ruled that restraints imposed for
the benefit of the licensee, not the patentee, are measured by a stan-
dard of the antitrust laws, not the patent laws.108 While a licensor
may, in some circumstances be permitted to impose a use restriction
on the first sale, a number of courts have held that it cannot restrict
the use on resale. ' 0 9
United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 110 dealt most directly with the an-
ticompetitive nature of prohibiting parallel imports. Guerlain con-
cerned three consolidated antitrust actions brought by the United
States under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." ' I The defend-
ants were accused of attempting to monopolize the importation into,
and sale within, the United States of certain trademarked toilet,
102 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977); Muenster
Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980).
103 See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1948); Park-
way Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823, 825-26 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aft'd,
255 F.2d 641, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the
Bureau of Customs, 57 TRADE-MARK REP. 14, 18 (1957).
104 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
105 Timken, 341 U.S. at 599.
106 See id. at 598.
107 141 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Il. 1956).
108 See id. at 114.
10()9 See Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys., 169 F. Supp. 1, 29
(E.D. Pa. 1958), afftd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959). See also
Taylor, Analyzing Licensee-Licensor Relationships: The Methodology Revisited, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
577 (1986).
I 10 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurs. noted sub nonm. Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, vacated and remanded sub nora. Guer-
lain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
H Id. at 79.
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goods." 2 The court held that the defendants' exclusion of genuine
goods imported by others who bought their goods from the defend-
ants' French affiliates constituted a monopolistic violation of the
Sherman Act."13 In Guerlain the domestic trademark-holding im-
porter, which was closely related to the foreign manufacturer, at-
tempted to monopolize the importation of the foreign
manufacturer's goods into the United States."14 The case subse-
quently was dismissed based upon anticipated legislative action
which never occurred." 5 Thus, attempts to restrict sales unduly and
to overextend intellectual property rights are subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
"Authorized" dealers try to shut out "grey market goods" to
maintain separation between markets, engage in geographic price
discrimination, and exploit the demand in the U.S. market by ob-
taining higher profits than would be possible if there was open com-
petition. The effect is to restrict supply and raise prices. Virtually all
economic arguments for prohibiting parallel imports assume that it
is wrong for "diverters" to undersell "authorized" dealers. The mo-
tive for prohibiting parallel imports, however, is to distinguish be-
tween those customers with strong demand who are charged more
(U.S. citizens), and those considered to have a more elastic demand
who are charged lower prices (everyone else), rather than to protect
authorized dealers.
For example, assume one customer will pay thirty dollars, an-
other twenty dollars, and a third ten dollars, for an item. If the man-
ufacturer can discriminate, he will charge the highest amount each is
willing to pay. If he cannot discriminate, he must determine a single
profit maximizing price, twenty dollars. The higher price customer
saves ten dollars at the expense of the manufacturer and the ten dol-
lar purchaser who will no longer buy the product. Price discrimina-
tion does not exist without market power over the product, which
does not exist without effective interbrand competition or collusive
behavior.1 6 Price discrimination provides an opportunity for arbi-
trage: "diverters" buy in the low price territory and resell in the
higher price territory. Foreign manufacturers then strive to prevent
diversion.
Geographic price discrimination between national markets pro-
vides substantial economic rewards. If the government allows dis-
112 Id.
'3 Id. at 91.
114 Id. at 79.
115 See Guerlaini, 357 U.S. at 915; see also COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915 (citing H.R. 7234,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959)).
I "! C. Collier, Competition, Policy and Parallel Imports, Remarks at the Second An-
nual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of International Trade (Oct. 23,
1985).
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crimination, marketing affiliates of foreign manufacturers
accumulate monopoly profits. Firms interested in reducing inter-
brand competition are induced to form foreign cartels to reap the
collective rewards of discrimination.
Domination of mass merchandised consumer product lines by
foreign manufacturers from the same country enhances the opportu-
nities for cartels. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co.,117 which has been pending for a decade and a half, charged most
major Japanese television manufacturers with forming a cartel by
agreeing to geographic price discrimination schemes and setting
prices for the United States.' 18 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed in part a trial court decision upholding the claim by two
U.S. television manufacturers that defendants violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act as well as the Wilson Tariff Act." 19 The Supreme
Court currently is considering whether there is more than sufficient
evidence to exclude the possibility of independent action under the
standard enunciated in Monsanto v. Sprayright Service Corp.. 120 The em-
phasis in Zenith is upon direct evidence of an actual conspiracy known
as the Japanese Electronics Products Manufacturers Conspiracy.12'
The case questioned whether a foreign government can permit retail
price fixing schemes designed to operate in the United States. 122
Some opponents of grey market goods have found support in
the U.S. Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines issued
on January 23, 1986.123 These guidelines are criticized for being too
lax on manufacturers and not reflecting trade regulation law.' 24 The
guidelines focus upon manufacturer flexibility to the exclusion of re-
tailer innovation and discourage intrabrand price competition.' 2 5
The U.S. Congress, among the most vehement critics of the guide-
lines, passed the Justice Department Appropriation Act of
117 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd and remanded sub nora. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
118 513 F. Supp. at 1120.
'19 723 F.2d at 240; see Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); Wilson Tariff
Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982)).
120 Zenith, 106 S. Ct. at 1362; see also Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752 (the correct standard
requires evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and
nonterminated distributors were acting independently).
121 Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1117. See also Improper Standard was Used to Revive Japanese TI'
Case, Supreme Court Rules, 50 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 565 (1986).
122 Id.
123 U S. Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, reprinted in 48 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP (BNA) (Special Supp.) 3 UJan. 24, 1985) (hereinafter Vertical Restraints
Guidelines); see also HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. 399, 94TH CONG., lST SESS. RE-
PORT ON TIlE VERTICAL RESTRAINT GUIDELINES (1985), reprinted in 49 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) 952 (1985) (hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT).
1'4 HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 123 at 955.
125 See generally id. at 954-55.
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1985/86,126 a congressional resolution known as the Rud-
man/Metzembaum Bill in the Senate, and the Fish/Rodino Amend-
ment in the House.1 27 This resolution specifically condemns the
Vertical Restraint Guidelines as inaccurate expressions of federal an-
titrust law and congressional intent.' 28 While the subject is under
debate, Congress will probably continue to support free and open
competition for parallel imports. Moreover, even under the lax Jus-
tice Department guidelines, restraints prohibiting parallel imports
are a substantial restraint of trade because they are likely to facilitate
interbrand collusion or exclusion of rivals. The guidelines specifi-
cally note that suppliers may attempt to facilitate collusion among
dealers if direct collusion among suppliers proves difficult and if the
suppliers can share in the excess profits. 12 9
The primary or upstream market and the secondary or down-
stream market of parallel imports are the same when there is vertical
integration of foreign manufacturers with U.S. marketing subsidiar-
ies. This is the usual situation in the U.S. marketplace for mass mer-
chandized consumer products; the "authorized" distributor is the
marketing affiliate of the foreign producer. Antitrust laws are cir-
cumvented when the supplier-participants can agree outside the
United States. The free rider claim is concomitantly inapplicable be-
cause the international enterprise reaps reward from all sales.
V. Product Control by Other Means
Agreements among foreign manufacturers and licensees re-
stricting the transfer of products after first sales can achieve control
over world markets. Privity of contract between the parties to a dis-
pute may be an obstacle with such arrangements. The Uniform
Commercial Code specifically provides that a purchaser, even one
who has only voidable title to property, conveys good title and com-
plete control over the product to a subsequent purchaser in the dis-
tribution chain.' 30 Contract restrictions also raise questions of the
effect on U.S. markets and prices and the extraterritorial scope of
U.S. antitrust laws governing cartels.13
126 H.R. 2965, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1136. The National Association of State Attorney Generals also announced
a program to attack vertical restraints of trade by applying automatic illegality more strictly
to resale price maintenance and tying arrangements. NAAG Vertical Restraints Guide Is Coher-
ent Enforcement Strategy, 49 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1032 (1985).
127 S. Con. Res. 56, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 9568 (1985); H. Res. 303,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 9324 (1985).
128 See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, stipra note 123.
129 Vertical Restraint Guidelines, supra note 123 at 6; see also C. Collier, sipra note 116.
130 See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1978).
1"1 See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752; Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1100. For a discussion of the
privity requirement in an antitrust context see W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus.,
589 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
248 [VOL. I I
1986] INFLUX OF GREY GOODS 249
In a transaction for noncounterfeit goods, where the buyer and
seller each receive the consideration for which they bargained, the
transaction is usually closed. Recently, however, aggressive sellers
and purchasers have made allegations of civil and 'criminal fraud
commonplace.' 32 In the wake of Sedima v. Imex Co.,' s 3 RICO viola-
tion claims will be more prevalent.' 34 Despite the fact that diversion
of goods is not unlawful, in one of several recent federal indictments
an appellate court upheld a conviction where a purchaser had repre-
sented itself as a charitable organization. 135 This case contradicts
the longstanding decision in United States v. Boxer, 136 in which defend-
ants devised a scheme to "defraud" pharmaceutical manufacturers
by falsely representing that the purchases were for subsequent resale
to foreign hospitals.' 3 7 Potential criminal liability, even if distin-
guishable or remote, chills competition through "diversion." Con-
gress must clarify its intent to encourage the open competition
promoted by parallel imports.
Most remaining issues raised by opponents of the "grey market"
appear designed to cloud rather than enlighten the debate. The is-
sue of manufacturers' warranties is an example. Most grey market
goods are mass merchandised products which have the warranty of
the distributor with conditions equal to or greater than the compara-
ble manufacturer warranty. To date, New York is the only state that
has enacted specific legislation governing the subject. The New York
132 See United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11 th Cir. 1985);Johnson &Johnson
v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., No. 85 Civ. 3996 (D.N.J. Aug. 1985); Johnson & Johnson v.
Allou Distrib., No. 85 Civ. 3233 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1985).
133 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (court held that defendant in private action need not be
previously convicted of a predicate act or a RICO violation and that a "racketeering in-
jury" need not be established by plaintiff as opposed to an injury from predicated acts
themselves).
134 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codi-
fied as 81 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135 See Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 1522.
136 72 Crim. 462 at 863-65 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1973).
137 Judge Ryan, dismissing the complaint, held:
[These] drug companies placed or attempted to place upon the merchandise
they had sold these defendants for delivery and for use in a foreign country,
restrictions upon what would happen or what should happen or could hap-
pen to these products or pharmaceuticals .... The antitrust laws provide
that once you have sold merchandise to a purchaser you cannot further re-
strict the market in which that merchandise is sold or is to be sold .... [T]he
complaint here is that the property which was intended to be used and sold
in a foreign country was brought back into this country and marketed here in
violation of what they claim was the agreement they had with these people,
and that thereby these drug companies were defrauded and deprived of their
property rights, and therefore the mails were used with intent to defraud and
for the purpose of defrauding them, and that these defendants are guilty of a
violation of the fraudulent use of the mail statutes. [Tihe activities of the
defendants, as charged by the indictment, with respect to the use of the drug
products manufactured in the United States, do not and could not constitute
a fraud .... The fraud charged in the indictment must fall when considered
in the context of the antitrust laws of the United States.
Id. at 863-65.
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law provides for disclosure that there is no manufacturer's warranty
unless a retailer, distributor, importer or other financially responsi-
ble person provides such a warranty.' 38 Congress easily could enact
similar legislation.
One solution for foreign manufacturers who perceive
'problems" from the "grey market" is to use different marks for
overseas and domestic markets to designate intended separate mar-
kets. Foreign manufacturers alone control what marks they affix to
their products. The, benefits of "globalized" markets depend upon
the efficient allocation of resources without geographic price dis-
crimination by sellers. Particularly when U.S. citizens are intended
victims, it is appropriate for Congress to reaffirm its intent to prevent
price discrimination.
VI. Conclusion
Three decades ago Congressman Emmanuel Cellar introduced a
bill in Congress to codify Guerlain, but it was never enacted.' 3 9
Whether to admit parallel imports is a political decision that rests
upon considerations of international trade and competition in do-
mestic markets. Though the Administration has held fast against
protectionist trade barriers, protectionism is not an issue when "grey
market goods" are manufactured overseas.
Foreign manufacturers, their wholly-owned U.S. marketing sub-
sidiaries, and their high-margin "authorized" or "captive" retailers
continue to suggest that the merchandise imported "without author-
ity" is shoddy, illegitimate, or tainted. These claims are without
merit. The evidence shows a scheme to charge U.S. consumers
higher prices than are charged the rest of the world. Congress, how-
ever, has not provided for the total exclusion of parallel imports.
The potential for harassment, "strike suits," and duplicating and
conflicting judicial decisions in various jurisdictions underlines the
need for Congress to reaffirm the statutory framework that permits
parallel imports under all the laws of the United States.
138 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1986). The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
2312 (1982)) apparently mandates the requisite disclosures.
139 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915 (citing H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)); see
also supra note 115 and accompanying text. H.R. Res. No. 3776, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1985), now pending, would "protect patent, trademark, and copyright owners" from im-
portation of grey market goods. Id. at 1. It authorizes $ 1,000 damages for fraud by mark
owners and $50,000 damages for trademark infringement. Id. at 30, 31. Opposition to the
bill is anticipated because it appears to lump a process patent issue together with the paral-
lel import issue.
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